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“Where is the Graal?” 
— Parsifal 
 
„Der Einsprung in den anderen Anfang ist der Rückgang in den ersten und umgekehrt.“ 




Global Society’s Man-Nature Communication Emergency 
 
In the conclusion of his Religions in Global Society (2006), Peter Beyer alludes to an 
“insufficiency” in the work he had just completed. Namely the inability of the theory of 
communication he spoke of in his book to deal with communication between Global Society 
and “non-human realities” outside Global Society (BEYER 2006: 301). Why draw attention to 
this insufficiency? What is noteworthy or problematic about it? Simply the fact that this 
admission constitutes yet another symptom of an ever more troubling prospect, namely, the 
likelihood that Global Society’s lines of communication with Nature are presently so tenuous 
it is in danger of being incapable of assuring the ecological conditions necessary for its 
existence. At least this is so if it is true that one cannot assure one’s ecological conditions of 
possibility unless one is able to communicate with those conditions.  
 
This is of course a controversial thing to say, for in recent years it has become fashionable in 
many quarters to doubt that an inability to “dialogue” with Nature is a problem. This attitude 
has been fostered in part by those who suggest that the climate change “scare” is merely a “dark 
green, deep ecology conspiracy” and in part by those who see the absence of total certainty 
about where current climate change trends are heading as an opportunity to deny a problem 
exists. These observers are abetted in their “Nature scepticism” by academics and theorists who 
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not only deny that Nature possesses an autonomous dynamics or the semiological means to 
communicate data about it, but even deny the ontological possibility of the environment 
(EDWARDS, ASHMORE & POTTER 1995: 25-49; MACNAGHTEN & URRY 1998: 22, 32 and BECK 
1999: 21).  
 
Mercifully, there is some opposition to the apostles of Nature negationism. These opponents 
tell us that the concept of Global Society as nothing more than a “speciesist”, “humankind-
only” club is ecologically untenable and that apathy about the importance for it to start 
dialoguing meaningfully with Nature has created a dangerous communication emergency 
(SERRES, HARVEY, HAMILTON).1 Wisely, they add that the opportunity for coming up with 
viable solutions for this communication challenge is dwindling daily.  
 
What is impacted first and most by the criticism implicit in the forgoing remarks is of course 
the main source of Beyer’s ideas on global communication, to wit, Luhmannian “systems 
theory”. But that is not all. So also are almost all other “Post-modernist” or “Post-rationalist” 
models for negotiating across the frontier separating Man and Nature. We think in particular of 
the theorists who are identified as “social constructivists”, “neo-pragmatists”, “post-
structuralists” and the proponents of “Actor-network theory”.  
 
This accusation could of course cause consternation among those in the ranks of the theorists 
so condemned. Not just because they would contest the idea that ascribing the epithet “post-
modernist” to their respective discourses justifies overlooking all the things which distinguish 
and singularise the schools of thought each of them belong to; but also because they would not 
accept that they fail to recognise the need to devise viable means of communication across the 
Man-Nature divide and have failed to propose ways to meet this need. And of course, this 
objection is far from groundless. For, sure enough, just like Luhmannian systems theory, many 
of them do indeed address the issue and do so head on. What is more, in doing so there is a 
tendency to rely less and less on “strong program social constructivism” which denies there is 
anything sui generis about Nature either ontologically, epistemologically, semiologically or in 
any other way2. Indeed the tendency to compromise with the tenets of “realism” has got to the 
                                                          
1 For all references see the Bibliography. Dates are included in text only when there is more than one reference 
per author. 
2. BENTON 2001b: 10; LIDSKOG 1998: 19ff. and MURPHY 2004: 251. 
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point that the constructivists who flirt with it have begun to be accused by other constructivists 
of defending “thinly disguised neo-realism”3.  
 
So why do we say that “post-modernist” ways of dealing with the Man-Nature communication 
challenge do not work? Certainly not because we think communication strategies premised by 
the tenets of “realism” or “scientific naturalism” hold the key to improved communication with 
Global Society’s more-than-human Other. And not just because there is something 
embarrassingly naïve in the view that “the world is as it is, no matter what any person happens 
to believe about it, and there is one correct ‘God’s-Eye-View’ about what the world really is 
like”4; but also because the sort of “communication” with Nature that seems to matter most to 
scientific naturalism is the one that helps us frack her more savagely than ever. Indeed, far from 
seeking a solution for our communication emergency by picking sides in the “science wars” 
which pit realism against constructivism, we see their sterile and circular gigantomachia as 
central to the problem. Just consider the dialectics and the rationality governing this 
gigantomachia—and how no one benefits from it except its protagonists.  
 
Worrying signs of a costly intellectual decay: “Tweedledum and Tweedledee agree to have 
a battle”  
 
The rationality of the gigantomachia consists of privileging one side or another of the basic 
“dualisms” which define the discursive space where constructivism and realism confront one 
another and which “legitimates” the rationality of the views expressed in that confrontation. In 
other words, one chooses either “Culture” or “Nature”, “subjectivism” or “objectivism”, 
“Idealism” or “Realism”, “nomos” or “physis”, “sociocentric constructivism” or “hylocentric 
realism”5. However, scarcely is that choice made than one realises that it is not an option to be 
too reductive or “autological” about one’s choice. For if we have learned anything from the 
earlier “Methodenstreit” or “two cultures” debates on similar issues, it is that any attempt to 
elaborate a purely realist or a purely constructivist “system” results in all sorts of semiological, 
epistemological and ontological impasses: that is, impasses which cannot be addressed or 
                                                          
3. See COLLINS & YEARLEY 1992; BLOOR 1999 and DEMERITT 2001: 782, 787 on Bruno LATOUR. 
4. JOHNSON 1987: x. 
5. BATESON 2002: 203; BENTON 2001a: 133-34 and PICKERING 2008: 25.  
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overcome except by borrowing resources belonging to the side of the bi-polarity one does not 
want to privilege.  
 
So to get around this difficulty, one integrates both poles of the operative dualisms into a 
“consilient”, second order meta-discourse which allows one to continue privileging only one 
pole without in so doing being deprived of what one needs from the pole one does not privilege 
in order to develop and defend a viable system. Hence Bruno Latour’s “Compositionist 
Cosmopolitics” continues to be a variant of constructivism but differs from its “strong program” 
variants because it occupies the “middle ground” between constructivism and realism. 
Likewise, “critical realism”, “liberal naturalism”, “environmental sociology”, “new 
materialism” and “object-oriented ontology” remain variants of realism but differ from 
“unqualified naturalism” because they constitute a “consilience” between this pole and the 
constructivist pole.  
 
The problem with this sort of dialectics is not just that those who use it are liable to the suspicion 
that their second order meta-discourses simply replicate in themselves the first order dualisms 
they are undertaken to transcend and “sublate” (aufheben)6. Nor is it that for this very reason 
they are vulnerable to deconstructive sniping from both sides in this “science war”. Graver still 
is the way this dialectic perpetuates and – albeit unwittingly – compounds a triple aporia at the 
heart of Global Society’s communication emergency and, accessorily, its failure to engage in 
fruitful dialogue with its non-human Other.  
 
The “triple aporia” at the heart of European Rationalism’s current ontological, 
epistemological and semiological impasses 
 
What is this “triple aporia”? It is the fact that we have no subject-centred determination of 
Being, Meaning and Knowledge which suffices to account for the Being, Meaning and 
Knowledge of what is not subject-centred. Nor do we have an object-centred determination of 
Being, Meaning and Knowledge which suffices to account for the Being, Knowledge and 
Meaning of what is not object-centred. And, finally, “dialectically” combining these two 
                                                          
6. A single quote from E.O. WILSON (2010: 297) suffices to illustrate the point: “The central idea of the consilience 
world view is that all tangible phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based 
on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of 
nature” (italics mine, FB). See also PROCTOR 2009. 
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determinations fails to result in a synthesis which provides each with what each lacks to 
constitute a viable “system” unto itself.7 Why? Because such an aspiration is feasible only if 
they are accompanied or, rather, joined by something that post-rational orthodoxy steadfastly 
rejects. Namely a third, higher, external or extramundane “principle” or “ground” which would 
be irreducible to either a subject-centred or an object-centred determination of Being and 
Meaning but would nonetheless be an inexpungable part of both because its existence and 
operations are postulated to explain that wherein, whereby and even wherefore subjects and 
objects interface, interpoetise and interpredicate one another existentially, phenomenologically, 
ontologically, epistemologically and semiologically.  
 
Why does post-rational orthodoxy forswear such a resource? Why in other words is it happier 
to deal with the aporias which result from the refusal to admit the existence and operations of 
such an “uncontrollable externality” (DENNETT 2007: 132, RORTY 1997: 31) than it is to make 
life easier for itself by embracing it? Because doing that entails compromising with 
metaphysical, onto-theological, transcendental, mythopoeic or supernatural “fictions”. And 
who can blame them for not wanting that? Since Nietzsche most accept that the totalising, all-
unifying “higher principles” which structure and modulate Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian 
thought amount to “higher swindles”. And few today would argue with Foucault, Deleuze, 
Popper and others who emphasise that these “fictions” have been cynically manipulated for 
centuries by “state machines” to constitute “hegemonic signifying regimes” or totalising 
“epistemic systems” ever ready to justify injustice, oppression and the intolerable (NIEMAN 
2002: 182). 
 
But if this is legitimate as a concern, so also is it legitimate to believe that Global Society should 
be refused no resource that could be useful for negotiating an entente cordiale with Nature and 
in that way assure its ecological conditions of possibility. Indeed, it is legitimate to suspect that 
the line separating the post-rational and the irrational has been crossed when intellectuals 
believe it is more important for them to turn out ever more strident denunciations of Hegel’s 
“absolutes Wissen” than it is to undertake the speculative work that needs to be done to deal 
with Global Society’s communication emergency.  
                                                          
7. In any case, it is impossible to see how this results from the models that have been put forward in recent years, 
for ex., E.O. WILSON’S ideas on “consilience”, John McDowell’s “second nature” reasoning (MCDOWELL 1994) 
and LUHMANN’s “transjuctional logic” (LUHMANN 1998: 82).  




How then do we deal with this dilemma? How do we steer clear of outmoded paradigms without 
transforming our legitimate reservations about them into misplaced reasons for neglecting 
speculative resources that could be useful for Global Society? They could even be vital in 
dealing with its greatest communication challenge, namely that of fostering and facilitating 
communication with Nature. On the face of it one might assume that something needs to be 
done to relieve European Rationalism and Post-Rationalism of their qualms about “Religion” 
and indeed even “Philosophy” in as much as speculation about “transcendentalia”, 
“metaphysical grounds” and “ultimate causes” remain a part of their job description. For at 
bottom the hostility directed at “extramundane subjects”, “totalising métarécits” and 
“metaphysical hoaxes” and the insistence on replacing them with “emptiness” or “unmarked 
space” (LUHMANN 1998: 27 & passim) reflects a fear that Religion could again become an 
arbiter in matters of concern to Global Society and lead the way in making progress on them.  
 
Can “Religion” help with Global Society’s Man-Nature Communication Crisis and if so 
in what role and at what cost?  
 
Obviously our own reasons for suggesting that a “function system” like “Religion” should be 
given some sort of droit de cité in the matters presently under consideration have nothing to do 
with the idea that “men of the cloth” ought to assume a “leadership” role in Global Society. We 
have already recognised the legitimacy of the reserves expressed by the defenders of Post-
rationalism about hegemonic theologico-religious métarécits and we have no intention of going 
back on those reservations. Besides, contesting any acceptation of Rationalism in the name of 
any acceptation of Religion would be tantamount to engaging in the dualistic mode of reasoning 
we have already denounced as sterile and circular. Finally, it has been known for some time 
that a religious “search for supernatural being can easily become an endeavour hostile to man 
and environment” (NAESS 1989: 190; FOLTZ 2014: 203-14). So, in fine, claims on behalf of 
theistic supernaturalism as trivial as those that Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Richard Rorty 
or Christopher Hitchens make against it have nothing to do with our reasons for suggesting 
Religion could be useful as a resource for addressing Global Society’s communication 
emergency. In fact, all that justifies giving Religion a droit de cité in the matters presently under 
consideration are two arguments we think any reasonable Post-rationalist would recognise as 
legitimate. First we need to recognise that among the many consequences of man-made 
degradation of the natural environment is the need to reassess what it means to be “rational” 
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and “irrational” by accepting that some of the things we had hitherto deemed to be “extra-
rational” or “less than rational” may now no longer deserve such an assessment. Second, we 
need to recognise that Religion—or some “function system” analogous to it—may not merely 
belong to the category of things meriting such a reassessment but may even be a prerequisite 
for dealing intelligently with the problems entailed by our poor relations with Nature and, more 
generally, with our non-human Other. At least this would be the case if we accept (i) that it is 
“rational” to favour any initiative which facilitates communication and dialogue between Man 
and Nature, (ii) that such an aspiration is facilitated by postulating some sort of “transcendental 
agency” or “platform” to mediate between Man and Nature and, finally, (iii) that no “function 
system” is as suited as Religion for theorising about the modus operandi of the transcendental 
mediating resource that Global Society needs. 
 
However, simply getting “Religion” to help Global Society by offering the latter this sort of 
speculative handiwork cannot be an end in itself if it is to secure all the results it is enrolled to 
assure. For far more is at stake than merely helping European Rationality or Post-rationality out 
of the speculative impasses they are powerless to deal with themselves. Nor is it enough simply 
to convince humankind that its Lebenswelt is more and other than a “speciesist”, inter-
subjectively grounded, semiosphere and that it fails to accept this at its peril. Ultimately what 
is required is a transformation of perceptions, cognition, attitudes, aspirations and behaviour 
on the scale of a species. So if we want that, the role “Religion” plays as a resource for helping 
us to interface and communicate more “sustainably” with Nature cannot be disjoined from more 
mundane, “average everyday” concerns and pursuits. More to the point, Religion has to be 
useful for transforming the intelligence we gain from improved communication with Nature 
into applications whose net result would be to end habits and attitudes which are destructive by 
making us see that a “sustainable” entente cordiale between Global Society and Nature is 
something valuable, desirable and rewarding. To be sure this happens, ethical arguments, 
consequentialist casuistry, soteriological enticements and other specifically “religious” ways of 
exercising influence can play a useful role. But by themselves they are not enough. 
Humankind’s appetites, volition and egoism too must be harnessed to the goal of “doing the 
right thing” because doing the right thing gratifies the doers’ “pleasure principle”.  
 
So how can we do this? How can we make Global Society see Religion as valuable because it 
constitutes a speculative, ethical, aesthetic and practical resource Global humanity can use in 
effectively addressing its communication emergency? Faced with similar questions others have 
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invoked the theories of earlier thinkers who involved religious or quasi-religious speculation in 
the attempt to create an entente cordiale with Nature. Particularly inspiring are recent studies 
by Akeel Bilgrami on John Toland’s “rational hermeticism” in Pantheisticon and by Elaine 
Miller on Schelling’s Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature8. Numerous works on a variety of other 
“romantic” thinkers and artists, notably Friedrich Hölderlin, would also merit mention here. 
But while we admire these efforts, and will attempt something similar ourselves, we will 
nonetheless try to avoid a pitfall that none of the foregoing quite escape. This pitfall lies in 
articulating the mediating rôle they give Religion in terms of an opposition – avowed or tacit – 
to Reason and, more commonly, Science. For the reasons we developed above, we are 
convinced that this sort of antagonism leads nowhere. 
 
But, in the end, can such a dispute be avoided? Can Religion be involved, either as a “function 
system” or in any other guise, in the attempt to make progress on any issue of concern to 
contemporary Global Society and not ipso facto be in conflict with Reason or Science?  
 
“De-bifurcating” Religion and Reason … and doing it viably  
 
It certainly cannot if we rely exclusively on conceptual, discursive and speculative resources 
that foredoom us to see them as opposed because those resources are congenital to an 
acceptation of rationality defined by and founded upon the requirement that Religion and 
Science be opposed. And in saying this it is important not to overlook what is implicit in the 
reference to what “founds” Modern and Post-modern rationality. For the opposition between 
Religion and Science that all “rational” – and therefore “post-rational” – commentators take for 
granted is not written in the stars. It is the result of a decision made in the course of the history 
of Philosophy to split them apart from one another and from the unitas multiplex of which they 
are membra disjecta. And the “splitting apart” I refer to here considerably predates the fateful 
seventeenth century. In fact it coincides with the very birth of philosophy.9 This implies that if 
we want to see them collaborating harmoniously and productively in tandem in making progress 
on issues of concern to Global Society —be it in regards to communicating with Nature or 
anything else—we have no choice but to do something “radical”. That is to say, we need to 
                                                          
8. Cf., respectively, BILGRAMI 2010: 23-54 and MILLER 2005: 295-316. Cf. also KLINK 1992: 208-9 on the need 
to pass from an “I – It” to an “I – Thou” mode of communication with Nature.  
9. Cf. JAEGER 1980: 204f.; GRAF 1994: 41ff.; DICKIE 2001: 20-21 and GREGORY 2013: 45f. See also MAUSS 1972: 
92; ELIADE 1991: 15, 39; SIMONDON 1989; KINGSLEY 1995: 229-32; WHITEHEAD 1920: 16-17, 24.  
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appeal to the earlier, “pre-philosophical” or “pre-rational” rationality against which both the 
Modernist and the Post-modernist rationalities define themselves by rejecting the erstwhile 
non-opposition of Religion and Reason or Religion and Science and preferring instead to see 
them as permanently at war with one another. But to which “rationality” am I referring? 
Thinking very much along the lines of Mircea Eliade, Gilbert Simondon, Roy Rappaport and 
Peter Kingsley I shall refer to this “benchmark” rationality as the “magical worldview”.  
 
The Rationality of the “Magical Worldview” as a model   
 
If there is anything sui generis about this wretchedly polythetic notion,10  it is the way it 
federates Religion and Science by subsuming both in an overarching “cosmonomy” or 
“cosmodicy” (cf. infra) which makes the functions and operations of each dependent on those 
of the other thereby obliging them to work harmoniously in tandem or fail to be of any use or 
value to anyone. And the interest of invoking the “magical worldview” in the context of the 
modern era’s “communication emergency” is not confined only to its utility as a model to 
emulate in the attempt to reconcile Religion and Science and in so doing make them collaborate 
in improving Global Society’s relations with the Nature. There is also the fact that “magic” is 
far less out of place in the contemporary debates than one might suspect. In any event, others 
see “re-enchantment” or “Neo-Animism” as an antidote for the fact that “the symbols of rational 
progress that guided the activities of the last few centuries seem to have outlived their utility”.11 
Moreover, one cannot but be struck by the propinquity of ancient methods and models for 
dealing with communication across the Man-Nature divide and the ideas of those who go 
furthest in trying to advance beyond the sterile “dualistic” or “bi-polar” thinking we analysed 
above. One thinks in particular of the ideas of Tim Ingold, Andrew Pickering, John Deely, 
Jesper Hoffmeyer and, considerably earlier, Gregory Bateson.  
 
                                                          
10. For discussion on the difficulties of imputing to the term “magic” anything approaching a univocal definition, 
cf. inter alia CUNNINGHAM 1999; OTTO & STAUSBERG 2013; HANEGRAAFF 2016: 393f. and DICKIE 2001: 18-
19. While we accept the arguments made against Edward Tylor and James Frazer for viewing “magic” as one 
category in a tripartite taxonomy made complete with the addition of “Religion” and “Science”, we nonetheless 
maintain that, at the time and in the culture we will look at, it is not inappropriate to qualify as “the magical 
worldview” the rationality from which both Religion and Science evolved and moreover to see it as conforming 
to three of Hanegraaff’s seven “concepts of magic”, namely: “ancient wisdom”, “natural philosophy and 
science” and “an enchanted worldview” (cf. HANEGRAAFF 2016: 399).  
11. LEE & ACKERMAN 2002: 123 & passim. Cf. also MERCHANT 2003: 274, n. 3; HARVEY 2005; INGOLD 2000; 
INGOLD 2006; HORNBORG 2006; HANEGRAAFF 2012 and ASPREM 2014. 
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A further reason for seeing a fresh assessment of the “magical worldview” as relevant and 
useful is to address the view that it cannot serve as a model because it is symptomatic of a 
“backward”, “barbaric” or “primitive” mentality. One is justified in holding that view if it is 
based on a reasoned assessment of the supposed limits of the “encyclopaedia” whence it issues. 
One is not justified in so doing if such a view reflects deeply entrenched cultural prejudices or 
ideologically motivated tendentiousness. We raise this point here because there is too little 
evidence that such a standard of critical rigour is respected by the pundits who express 
scepticism towards the idea that valuable lessons can be learned from these “primitive 
encyclopaedias”. That in any event will be central to the case we will make about the use of the 
latter as models not merely to discuss or assess, but even to emulate in coming to terms with 
Global Society’s real communication emergency.  
 
To develop all this in the space of one article I will impose certain limitations on my 
commentary. First I will consider only one praxis of magic, namely incantatory magic. Second, 
rather than looking at and inventorizing the multitude of ways incantatory magic was practised 
across very different cultural contexts, I will refer only to Hellenic sources and supporting 
evidence on incantatory magic (ἐπῳδία)”. Third, I will focus strictly on the “rationality” which 
“grounded” belief in the efficacy and utility of ἐπῳδία and lent a certain unity to the various 
expressions of its practice. Finally, I will concentrate only on those aspects of incantatory magic 
which are useful for making the case that the “worldview” in which it played a key 
“normatising” role is a model we should emulate if we want to address the communication 
“insufficiency” referred to in our introduction. Specifically, I will look at the following five 
points:  
 
(i) why magical rationalism thought Nature had a “voice” and a “language”,  
(ii) the intelligibility peculiar to this language and the way some people engaged in dialogue 
with the “actants” who spoke it,  
(iii) how those hermeneutists converted the information they gained in this dialogue into a 
foundation and an operational component of norms and values, tastes and aspirations, ways 
and means, art and science, etc., 
(iv) the paradox that the encyclopedia peculiar to this “primitive” rationality was anything but 
“anthropocratic” but for all that did not entail a debasement of anthropos, and, finally,  
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(v) why there is nothing farfetched about asking Religion and Science to embrace this 
rationalism, factor it into their respective acceptations of “progress” and, in tandem, 
negotiate an entente cordiale between Nature and Global Society.  
 
To get our analysis underway, let us consider what specialised studies have to say, first, about 
the “professionals” the Hellenes of yore depended on to “dialogue” with Nature’s actants and, 
second, the medium or “communication tools” they used to do this. 
 
Nature’s Oracle: Mapping the Lebenswelt in Music and Song  
 
For clarity’s sake, it should be pointed out that the age with which this study is concerned  is 
now commonly referred to as “Song culture”, a way of life that came to an end in archaic Hellas 
with the adoption of writing12. In these “preliterate” times the person Hellenic communities 
relied upon to communicate with Nature was a professional who combined the functions of the 
priest, the scientist and the artist. Revealingly, this professional was called an ἀοιδός or 
“inspired poet-singer”.13 He was given this title because when he dialogued with Nature it was 
in “music” or “μουσική” that he did so14. As we shall see repeatedly in the pages to follow, the 
communication functions assured by this “μουσική” were multiple and their importance 
incommensurable. It was as music that the “inspired” “singing poet” apprehended his 
environment, in music that he encoded or “scored” the intelligence he synthesised from 
listening to it, through this music that he apprised his listeners of this intelligence and thanks to 
this music that his audience received an education (παιδεία) and found meaning, purpose and 
joy in being “ethologically attuned” or “synchronised” to their greater-than-human universe.  
 
                                                          
12. HERINGTON: 3ff.; KURKE 2000 and FORD 2003, esp. his extremely perceptive remarks on Eric Havelock’s key 
contribution to the notion. 
13. Cf. MASLOV 2009: 17-21 on what separates the “mantic poetics” or “θέσπις ἀοιδή” of the “inspired” singer-
poet in Song culture both from the non-sacred “lays of mortals” (κλέα ἀνδρῶν) and from latter performers of 
“kitharodic and epic poetry” marked by the use of the dactylic hexameter. This paper is unconcerned with the 
time when and the reasons why “ἀοιδός” became synonymous with “liar”.  
14. On the Indo-European “Poet” cf. HAVELOCK 1963; TOPOROV 1981: 199-200; DETIENNE 1990: 98ff.; 
CAMPANILE 1987: 26; WATKINS 1995: 69ff. and WEST 2007: 26-45. On the connection between μουσική and 
the Sacred in archaic Hellenic poetics, cf. KOLLER 1954; GEORGIADES 1958; SNELL 1960: 87f.; BARMEYER 
1968: 55ff.; ROUGET 1990; SEGAL 1998: 10ff.; BENNETT 2016: 6-7 and MASLOV 2016: 427-28. To avoid a 
long disquisition on when, why and how chanted, musically accompanied verse performances (ἀοιδή) turned 
into “recited” poetry (on which GEORGIADES 1958: 58; JENSEN 1980: 121-22; NAGY 1990: 46), I restrict my 
remarks to archaic “melic” verse. 
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To see how “music” or “song” (μολπή, ἀοιδή, μελοποιία) could do all this, let us start by 
considering how the inspired aoidós interfaced with his Umwelt in such a way as to “hear” it as 
a sort of “music” he alone could discern. Here I refer to all the accounts we have of the aoidós 
as someone who was wont to sequester himself under an oak tree in a Dodonian glade or on the 
barren slopes of mountain Helicon, enter a “theoleptic trance” and whilst “out of his wits” (ἔξω 
ἑαυτοῦ) hear the otherworldly voices of Muses, Sirens, Nymphs and Pans singing to him 
through and as his natural surroundings15. What is likely to impress most first-time readers of 
the relevant passages in Hesiod, Parmenides, Pindar, Plato and the fragments of Sophocles is 
their unmistakably mystical or “religious” character. Which is understandable given that 
“divine pilgrimage” (θείων θεωριῶν) is a common way of describing what is happening to 
inspired aoidoí when they are hearing murmuring Muses 16 . Similarly, “sacred song” 
(θεσπιῳδία) was the name of the chanted verse through which the poet informed his public of 
what he learned from Muses, Sirens and Charites about world-creation. 
 
Still the fact that all this is presented in “religious” terms should not lead us to believe there 
was nothing “scientific” about it and that engaging in this sort of Science did not entail tangible 
and decidedly utilitarian applications for the way of life of the communities the Singing-Poet 
belonged to. One indication that this “θείων θεωριῶν” was an essentially scientific pursuit can 
be found in the fact that its practitioners were sometimes called “meteorologists” 
(μετεωρολογικοί)17. Indeed a form of “Natural Science” (ζήτησις περὶ τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως) 
consisting of enquiring into “events going on in the celestial vault and in the earth’s vasty 
deeps” was an integral part of the inspired aoidós’s job description18. And the fact that by the 
                                                          
15. For examples of these “amazing sounds” (θαύματ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι), cf. Hesiod, Theogony, 829-35; Homer, Od., 
12.181-200; Pindar, Pyth. 1.14-19, Ol. 6.62-67; Euripides, Bacchae, 1078-79. For commentary, analysis and 
numerous other references, see DODDS 1951: 117; CLAY 1972; FORD 1992: 180-95; SEGAL 1998: 124-25; 
COLLINS 1999; HARDIE 2004: 17; STODDARD 2005; GOSLIN. It would lead too far afield to discuss here the 
distinction that can – and from the “classical” age on should – be made between the inspired “oracle” (μάντις) 
and the singer (ἀοιδός) who gave musical form to the “theopneustic glossolalia” or “intimations” (σημεία) the 
oracle uttered. Suffice it to say that what we know of “mythical” figures like Orpheus, Musaeus and Tieresias 
suggests that in “Song culture” the distinction was inessential (cf. JENSEN: 121-22). 
16. Here I refer to the “vorphilosophische Bedeutung des griechischen Wortes théoria” as a “Sehen der 
Prinzipien” which was inherited and then rationalistically disfigured by Plato and Aristotle into what is now 
referred to as “βίος θεωρητικός”. For a discussion of the genealogy of the term “θεωρία” and what it was 
variously interpreted to mean, see CORNFORD 1912: 196-200; JAEGER 1948: 430-432; DODDS 1951: 64ff.; 
VERNANT 1996: 407-08; BURKERT 1985: 306ff.; RUTHERFORD 2001: 33, 409 and esp. RAUSCH 1982: 47ff. 
whom I quoted above.  
17. “Μετεωρολόγος” was not the only expression used for the practitioners of μετεωρολογία. It is however less 
negatively connoted than the alternatives, e.g., τερατοσκόπος or χρησμολόγος.  
18. “τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων παθημάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου”, PLATO, Ion, 531c. See also Theatetus, 173e, 
Republic, 596c; HESIOD, Theogony, 119, 669; PINDAR, Nem., 10.87sq. SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 300-
301 as well as; CORNFORD 1952: 130ff.; JAEGER 1965: 154ff. and VERNANT 1996: 385ff.  
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fifth century BCE the epithet “μετεωρολόγος” had become a way of showing contempt to anyone 
who claimed that θείων θεωριῶν was a viable way to conduct “Nature study”19 is no reflection 
of what was believed in “Song culture”. This becomes evident as soon as we take the risk of 
taking seriously the earliest attempts we know of to account for “inspiration” in purely 
“rational” terms.  
 
Prior to considering why the meteōrologós needed to be “inspired” or “possessed” to practice 
“Nature study”, let us remind ourselves – as summarily as we dare – of what counted as 
“Nature” and “the cosmos” in archaic Song culture. 
 
Poetic “Inspiration” (enthousiasmos) and “Nature Study” (meterorologia) 
 
This is of course a highly risky undertaking given all the scholarly fire-power marshalled behind 
the idea that, “there is no such thing as the cosmological model or the cosmological theory of 
the Greeks” (LLOYD 1975: 205). Still all the “reasoned account renderings” (λόγον διδόναι) 
pertaining to cosmopoiesis we know of share an unmistakable family resemblance and few are 
so fragmentary, elliptic or ambiguous that we cannot discern in them the same basic explanatory 
model. The point of departure of this cosmopoietic model is what was called “αἰθήρ” or “τὸ 
αὐτοφυής”, i.e., a self-subsisting, pre-cosmic protoplasm which qua pre-cosmic is only 
potentially any of the qualities, quantities or entities it can be made into20. This picture changes 
when this basic cosmological model is made complete with the addition of cosmopoietic 
principles referred to in earlier times as divinities like Zeus and Hestia or Ouranos and Gaia but 
that I shall call the Sky and the Earth. Their contribution to cosmos creation consists of 
performing a “sacred marriage” (ἱερὸς γάμος). This consisted of projecting energies at one 
another from opposite poles of the universe in such a way as to “temper” (πληγή) or “concoct” 
(πέσσεσθαι) the pre-cosmic aither between them into the “complexions” (συμπεπλεγμένα) that 
adorn the perceptible aspect of the world around us21. In the final analysis, this is all anything 
                                                          
19. This comes across forcefully in Aristophanes, Clouds, 225f.; Isocrates, Antidosis, 261-266 and Plato, Republic, 
488d-489a. However, compare with Cratylus, 401b; Phaedrus, 269e-270a and Laws, 967d. For commentary, 
CORNFORD 1952: 23, 131f.; BRISSON 1989: 227-8, n.392 and BRISSON 2000: 141-47. 
20. Cf. HEINRICHS 2010: 22 and FERRARI 2008: 5-6 on the use of “αὐτοφυής” as a “conventional” way of referring 
to an initial, pre-cosmic “πρώτη φύσις πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως”. To this epithet, and to others like it (e.g., 
χάος, νύξ, τι μεταξὺ, χώρα), applies the predicate Theophrastus used to describe Anaximander’s “Boundless”, 
namely “something whose nature is definable neither qualitatively nor quantitatively” (φύσις ἀόριστος καὶ 
κατ’ εἶδος καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος).  
21. Cf. GILBERT 1907: 28ff.; CORNFORD 1912: 63; FRÄNKEL 1975: 256-7, 389ff. and BETEGH 2014: 165. 
Knowledgeable readers will know that the use of variants of “σύμπλεξις” to translate “complexity” and the 
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really is, some sort of substance which is less than physical matter but more than pure void 
which gets tempered by the polemos of the Sky above and the Earth below until it “blisters” 
and as such a blister yields perceptible complexity22. All this is relevant to the “rumours” or 
“θαύματ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι” Oracles and inspired aoidoí claimed they heard whilst “out of their wits” 
(ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ) for what they were “hearing” was the “acoustic signature” of sky and earth 
energies working in tandem to “temper” an undifferentiated, pre-cosmified “αὐτοφυής” into 
perceptible “complexity”. 
 
So, what was supposed to credit the idea that an “acoustic signature” can be given to cosmos-
creating sky and earth energies? Why did people in Song culture take seriously the idea that 
“inspired” meteōrologoí were able to interface with the natural environment in such a way as 
to hear creation itself “singing” at them as the voices of Muses and Graces? A convenient way 
to answer that question is to advert to what specialised studies tell us about the profound 
difference between the way the average, “abled” percipient interfaces with their sensoria and 
the way the inspired, “sky-walking” meteōrologós does so. 
 
The Psychoacoustics of Inspiration: A Form of Applied “Clairaudience”? 
 
A simple way to describe this key difference would be to say that, in the case of the former, no 
form of stimulus afforded by the natural environment can cross the threshold of awareness 
unless at a minimum that stimulus is “co-natured” (συμφύεται) to one or another of its five 
normal senses. More precisely, the sense generating energies emitted by a potential perceptible 
have to “fit into” (ἐναρμόττειν) one or another of the percipient’s organs of sense by assuming 
forms which are commensurate with the “channels” (πόροι) covering their surfaces23. Only then 
                                                          
“complexions” of various “μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ὄντα” is an Aristotelian choice of word. This is legitimate given 
that what Aristotle expresses with this sort of terminology is essentially identical to what his predecessors say 
using other words. A case in point is Columns 14-15 of The Derveni Papyrus. Here we find a reference to the 
birth of Chronos as a by-product of the way Sky and Earth “smite against each other” (κρούεσθαι πρὸς 
ἄλληλα). But in the same columns it is perfectly clear that everything is “born from the sun to the earth because 
of the way they smite each other”. Similar imagery can be found in numerous other sources, for ex., the 
“anakalypsis” of Gaia that Pherecydes describes in DK7B2, the “impregnation” of “Chthona” in Aeschylus 
Fr. 25 (Loeb) and Alcman’s cosmogony as per WEST 1967; DETIENNE & VERNANT 1974: 134-35 and FERRARI 
2008: 5ff. Hence we do not betray the ideas of earlier cosmologists simply by privileging an Aristotelian choice 
of words.  
22. It is tempting to assume that what Plato says in Cratylus 412d-413c about a “τι διεξιόν” which functions as a 
“δι’ οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι” is a more or less fair representation of the activity that meteōrologoí 
claimed they could ‘hear’ while “ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ”. 
23. Particularly eloquent on this point is Empedocles DK31B100 & DK31A86. Cf. also Alcmaeon of Croton 
DK24A5 (= Theophrastus, De sensu, 25f .) on the “πόροι δι’ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις”.  
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and only in this way does the percipient’s Umwelt yield the complexions and complexity 
adorning its perceptible exterior.  
 
This contrasts starkly with the way the “inspired” meteōrologós or chrēsmologós interfaces 
with his environment whilst in the throes of a theoleptic fit. Indeed, while “ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ” he 
specifically filters out of his apprehension of his surroundings everything that can be sensed via 
the channels the rest of us rely on to sense it. However, this does not mean that he thereby stops 
interfacing with his Umwelt or that while doing so he is not perceiving anything. All it means 
is that he is using another sort of perceptual channel to do so. Channels which allow the inspired 
meteōrologós to, as it were, “sense past” the complexity adorning the perceptible side of his 
phaneron so that he can “auscultate” the way sky and earth energies blend with one another to 
give perceptible complexions, complexity and cosmos their perceptibility24. 
 
How should we describe this other-than-normal way of interfacing with the natural world and 
apprehending it in this unusual way? Though the details are vague, the bulk of the extant 
evidence would suggest that it involved the mastery of certain breath control techniques in 
which the practitioner tenses his “diaphragm” (prapides) in such a way as to transform his lungs 
into a sort of “resonance chamber” that functioned as a “transductor” for converting normally 
unsensed circumambient energies into a stimulus the meteōrologόs actually felt (εἰσκρίνεσθαι) 
as vibrations in his chest or viscea (σπλάγχνα)25. By focusing his attention only on the vibrations 
in his thorax directly imputable to the blends of sky and earth energies responsible for the “dis-
closure” (ἀνακάλυψις) of his Umwelt, the inspired meteōrologós was, in effect, witnessing the 
drama of “cosmoparturience” at first hand. 
 
But supposing the meteōrologós really was able to, so to speak, “tune in to” the Grundstimmung 
of creation and catch hieros gamos “in the act”, why did this matter to anyone but the 
meteōrologós himself? The question needs to be asked because the kind of intelligence the 
inspired meteōrologós sourced in this way made them an extremely important asset for his 
community. So important indeed that he was considered to be a “maître de la vérité” and the 
                                                          
24. The ability to do this is makes it a perfect example of the “μανία” Plato refers to at Phaedrus 265a as “madness 
arising from a divine release from customary habits”. 
25. This, I believe, is what Empedocles refers to in Fr. B5 (“γνῶθι διασσηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο”) while 
enjoining his listeners to use their “viscera” when attempting to “discriminate” the wisdom of the Muses. See 
also VERNANT 1996: 124-25, 143; FRANCOTTE 1985: 26-31; FRONTISI-DUCROUX 2002: 475-82; KINGSLEY 
1999: 109, 130; USTINOVA 2018: 331 and BENNETT forthcoming. 
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entire worldview (ἐγκυκλοπαίδεια) and way of life of his community was organized on the 
basis of this truth. We see why it made sense to people in Song culture to view things this way 
when we consider the operative assumption at work in their ideas about the nature of the world 
they dwelt in.  
 
The Importance of meteōrología for the needs of the community 
 
Basically, people then assumed that the world with which they were familiar was contained in 
a higher order reality whose governing laws they could not discern and which frequently and 
sometimes decisively interfered in and even controlled the things going on around them in the 
natural environment as well as through their own bodies and minds26. Understandably, this 
impression was, in a very real sense, the source of considerable anxiety27. Also understandable 
is the logic behind the idea that the inspired, meteōrología-practicing oracle (ἔνθεος μάντις) 
was a resource one could use to deal with this manner of apprehension. After all, if the latter’s 
greater-than-normal powers of perception gave them insight (εὖ εἰδώς) into the modus operandi 
of these mysterious forces, presumably they had foreknowledge of what the future may hold. 
Hence anything they could relate about what was presaged by this higher order causation was 
obviously extremely valuable given that things like health, wealth, security and power were 
dependent on or controlled by these agencies whose modus operandi were inaccessible to them.  
 
All of which raises a key question: how was the inspired meteōrologós able to communicate 
this all-important intelligence to his client community? More than that, how was he able to do 
so in such a way as to be sure that, as a result, his public ended up being synchronised to the 
“laws of Nature” or the “χορεία τοῦ ὅλου” and thereby equipped to attain “a life of happiness” 
(εὐαίωνα διαζῆν) and avoid misfortune (δυστυχία)? Was it via the “prophesies” pronounced by 
oracles at the local temple? Undoubtedly, just as it was via gnomic “precepts to live one’s life 
by” (ὑποθήκας ὡς χρὴ ζῆν) encoded sensu allegorico in so-called “didactic” poetry. So also 
was the practice of eulogising or stigmatising the exemplars of good or bad behaviour in 
mythology or history. But only as the “tip of the iceberg” (κορυφή) of a deeper, more pregnant 
                                                          
26. Cf. Hesiod, Work and Days, 42; Homer, Il. 2.484-487, Od., 18.130-137; Homeric Hymns to Demeter, 216-
217; Solon, 13.65-66; Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1486-7; Pindar, Nem., 11.44; Sermonides Fr. 1; Simonides, 
527; Archilochus Fr. 130; Theognis, 133-36, 1075; Plato, Statesman, 274c-d. For commentary and analysis, 
cf. OTTO 2014; DODDS 1951: 30; WINNINGTON-INGRAM 1980: Ch. 7; VERSNEL 2011: 152-153.  
27. VERSNEL: ibid.; JOUAN: 11-28; TEDLOCK: 189; EIDINOW: ch. 1. 
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“ulterior meaning” (σημεία, αἶνος, ὑπόνοια)28. A meaning encoded in music. For as indicated 
above it was primarily as music that the singer’s public was informed about the “truth” of the 
world it lived in   and to which it needed to be synchronised not merely to deal with “everyday 
problems” (τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀπορίαι) but also to attain “the greatest blessing a mortal can hope 
for”29.  
 
But how? How was music able to mime the dynamics of Nature to which the singer wished to 
“magically” synchronise his public in their perceptions, desires, doings and being?  
 
Making Cosmopoiesis audible … and Nature Apocalyptic and Eucharistic 
 
On this matter the challenge is double. It is first to demonstrate that there was a “mimetic”, one-
to-one correspondence between (1) particular arrangements of “musically” organised sound on 
one hand and on the other (2) particular arrangements of cosmic activity. Otherwise, why 
believe that mousiké was a medium one could depend on for communicating meaningfully with 
the Umwelt? The second challenge is to explain how hearing the music that could do this was 
amenable to engineering an entente cordiale between communities of humans and the natural 
world in whose midst they dwelt. 
 
Clarity on the first point depends on understanding why musical instruments and above all the 
voices of “inspired” singers were believed to quite literally contain the voices of the Gods. What 
lent this idea the credence it evidently enjoyed is the “conceit” that the meteōrologós – or a 
mousopoiós following his instructions – was able to confect “sound statues” (ἀγάλματα 
φωνήεντα) which were “alive” (ἔμψυχος) with the power of various “spirits” (δαίμονες) and 
singularly those of the Olympian “θεοὶ οὐράνιοι”. Though the details are sparse and open to 
various interpretations, it seems certain that the belief in the feasibility of such an enterprise 
rested upon the notion that there is a mimetic parallel between (1) the way inert air can be 
agitated by different kinds of friction to generate different kinds of sound and (2) the way pre-
cosmic aithér gets tempered by different blends of sky and earth energies to synthesise the ever-
                                                          
28. NAGY 1990: 234-38 on why the surface meaning of words in poetry are only the “culmination” (κορυφή) of 
deeper, not explicitly expressed meanings (σημεία). 
29. “βροτῶν ὄλβον ὑπέρτατον οἳ σχεῖν” (Pindar, Pythian, 3.89). 
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varying complexions and complexity adorning the perceived aspect of our respective sensoria30. 
On the basis of this parallel – and on the presumption that the mousopoios who composed the 
song had had an actual “epiphanic” encounter with the cosmocratic δαίμων whose spirit his 
song was supposed to capture – the sounds one was hearing in his performance were the 
“musical signature” of the forces that power (ἀναπέμπει) the world into its outward appearance.  
 
Needless to say, the modern reader will have difficulty imagining how anyone ever took 
seriously the idea that a par analogiam equivalence between melodically moulded air and 
mytho-poietic ideas on cosmos as the product of tempered aîthér justifies the assumption that 
“sacred song” (θεσπιῳδία) perforce contains the actual presence of the divine. Some may even 
question the propriety of so much as mentioning this crude fetishism in a scholarly endeavour 
of any kind. But the limitations imposed upon thinking and judgment by modern standards of 
analytical and critical rigour is beside the point. For all that matters here is what the archaic 
Hellenes thought about “sacred song”, and on this matter one thing is clear: For them, the way 
the inspired, meteōrología-practicing singer “fretted” inert air to make it yield the music in his 
carmina sacra was in this very way miming the friction that sky and earth energies exerted on 
pre-cosmic aither to make it into the complexions adorning the world we perceive when we 
notice what’s going on around us. About this there can be no doubt. Everyone then knew what 
melody and meter were doing in the sacred song they modulated. They were there to “over-
signify” the subject matter sung about in the performance by “epi-phon-ising” what was “God-
given” (διόσδοτος, θέοθεν, θεομόριος) about it. Hence, while listening to these instrumentally 
or vocally vehiculated sounds one was hearing what Ouranos and Gaia themselves would say 
if they had voices and could use those voices to tell their listeners who they are, what they do, 
how they do it and that it is important for the listeners to know what they do given that their 
“hieros gamos” yields not just the world the listeners dwell in but also the latter’s 
cosmonomically ordained “lot” (μοῖρα) in that world31.  
 
Consider this observation which illuminates the oft noted “rapt awe”, “wonder” and “ecstasy” 
that overcame audiences at performances of thespiodé. Mystery cult initiates referred to this 
experience as an “ὄργια μουσῶν”. What this means is that, thanks to the music accompanying 
                                                          
30. This comes across as well as not in Plato’s Cratylus, 426b-427d and in the sources analyzed by KOLLER 1954 
and GEORGIADES 1958. 
31. More on which, cf. KOLLER 1954: 119 & passim; BARMEYER: 55ff.; WEST 1967: 13; BORGEAUD: 135; 
FRANKLIN: passim; SEGAL 1998: 10ff.; LONSDALE: 52-56; GADAMER: 47; HARDIE: 22-25. 
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the performance of sacred song, the listeners apprehended the object of the song as though it 
was effervescing with the “God-given glory” (αἴγλα διόσδοτος) of the cosmos-synthesising 
dynamic that deposits it into its normal, average everyday familiarity. More than that, the whole 
world is experienced as a “gift from the Gods” (παρὰ θεῶν δῶρα) peopled entirely by creatures 
not alone radiating “sacral lustre” (ἐνάργεια) as though on fire with the power of the Gods that 
fuel their Being-there but also singing to the audience with the voice of the Muses and Graces 
about who they truly are32. Little wonder therefore that commentators see sense in speaking of 
the “delight” (τέρψις) induced by music as a “drug” (φάρμακον) whose euphoriant properties 
were, it seems, highly addictive33.  
 
So much, then, for what made “music” a means for giving the Umwelt a voice and a language 
and therefore a way to communicate intelligence about itself to the community the inspired 
singer performed to. What it was composed and performed to “mime” was the existence-
creating, existence-sustaining forces at work in, through and as the natural environment and as 
each of its multitudinous “creatures of a day” (ἐπάμεροι).  
 
But if this semiotic “conceit” confers some sort of credibility upon the claim that melody and 
rhythm gave inspired aoidoí the means to “epi-phon-ise” complexity and its constituent 
complexions “to the power of their cosmopoietic significance” (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργειαν), 
how does this give the performer the ability to practice “incantatory magic”? The question is 
important because by all accounts his sacred, musically accompanied song (ἔνθεοι ἐπῳδαί) was 
“psychagogic”. In other words, it had the power to “charm” or “hypnotise” its audience into an 
inability to resist doing and being what the song was composed and performed to make them 
do and be, namely “passions” or “replicants” of the cosmic order (“ξυνακολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ 
παντὸς παθήματι”). So, again, what makes this singing “psychagogic”?  
 
To answer this question, let us start by determining what in Song culture counted as authorised 
praxes of magic and do so by comparing it with the “Goetic theurgy” (γοητεία, ἀγύρτεια) that 
replaced it during the fifth century. 
 
                                                          
32. NIETZSCHE: 127f.; HAVELOCK 1963: 155f; SNELL 1960: 86f.; SEGAL: ibid.; FERRARI 2008: 108-118 and 
PEPONI 2012: 89ff.  
33. Homer, Od. 12.36-54; Plato, Phaedrus, 259b-d; Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, §14 and DICKIE 2001: 16.   
MARBURG JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2020) 
 
20 
What characterised archaic “Incantatory Magic” (ἐπῳδή) and what did  
Music have to do with its efficacy? 
 
By all accounts Goetic theurgy involved fraud and manipulating the gullible out of pure 
pecuniary self-gain. It also rested on the conceit that the theurgist could alter the laws of Nature 
just to suit the caprices of his clients34. The incantations administered by the singers of sacred 
song were entirely different. The object of their magical “ἔνθεοι ἐπῳδαί” was not the laws of 
Nature. It could not be. The physics of such an aspiration were self-evidently impossible and 
the intention immoral and blasphemous. Hence the object of enchantment and its magical 
powers was the singer’s audience. In other words, and more to the point, the authorised singer’s 
goal was to acoustically massage his listeners into a susceptibility to accept and collaborate 
willingly and even joyfully in realising the “fate” (μοῖρα, αἶσα, ἦθος) that was destined to be 
theirs because “Necessity” (Ἀνάγκη), Themis and her daughters the “Fates” (Μοῖραι) would 
have it no other way35. That in any event is clear in numerous passages of the Platonic dialogues 
devoted to “the nature of incantatory magic” (περὶ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς τὴν δύναμιν)36.  
 
The “rationality” governing the belief in the efficacy, utility and value of incantatory magic is 
compelling. The key assumption at work in it was that everything in the universe was subject 
to a cosmodicy. This means that, everything had a cosm(odict)ically ordained time, place, nature 
and destiny which was “appropriate” (εὐήθης, ἐναίσιμος, θέσμιος, σὺν δίκᾳ, εὖ κατὰ κόσμον) 
for it to occupy because doing so was compatible with the cosm(odict)ically ordained time, 
place, nature and destiny it was “appropriate” for the people and things around it to occupy37. 
From this assumption the conclusion was drawn that it was in humankind’s interest to 
                                                          
34. Hippocrates, The Sacred Disease, I, 2-6. Comp. Plato Republic, 364b-e & Laws, 933a-d. For commentary on 
the corruption of magical practices during the fifth century BCE and the growing disrepute of their officiants, 
OTTO 2014: 23; BURKERT 1985: 188; GRAF 1994: 41-45 and DICKIE 2001: 38-39, 61-63. 
35. Cf. Pindar, Pyth., 8.77-78 and Plato, Laws, 905a. For commentary cf. KOLLER 1954: 183ff.; OTTO 2014; 
RAUSCH: 21; HAVELOCK 1963: 150-159; WINNINGTON-INGRAM 1980: 154ff.; GENTILI 1988: 55; WALSH 1984: 
46-47, 57 and ROUGET: 372-386.  
36. Charmides, 156b-157b. Comp. Symposium, 187a-e; Republic, 401d and Laws, 903bc. 
37. HARRISON 1912: 517, 521ff. Cf. also JAEGER 1965: 323 (on Solon Fr. 13); VERNANT 1996: 235; GENTILI 1988: 
44 (on Anaximander DK12B1); WINNINGTON-INGRAM 1980: 169 (on Sophocles, Antigone, 456f.); FRÄNKEL 
1975: 131, n.32 (on Hesiod, WD 225-47 and Theogony, 901-3), 256-7, 389ff. (on Heraclitus DK22B114) and 
VERSNEL 2011: 155-56 (on Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus and Theognis). On the expression “εὐήθεία” as we 
are using it here, i.e., in its original, “etymological” sense and as a near synonym of “δικαιοσύνη” or 
“μετριοπάθεια”, cf. Republic, 343c, 348c, 400e and Laws, 679c.  
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understand and accept this basic fact and to act accordingly38. So, to the extent that “inspired” 
aoidoí knew how to do this and were able to “enchant” or “bewitch” (ἔθελξε, ἔτερψε, 
ἐφαρμάκευσαν) their audiences into making the cosmically prescribed adjustment, those artists 
were practicing magic or, to be precise, “sympathetic magic”. 
 
But, once again, what property of the inspired singer’s sacred song gave him the power to 
“enchant” or “hypnotise” his listeners into doing and being what he told them it was “good” or 
“right” for them to do and be? To answer that question, we need to take a closer look at the 
capacity of the music in melic verse to be not merely “wonder-inspiring” but also “euphoriant”. 
 
The Role of Delight (τέρψις) and Elation (εὐφροσύνη) in Musically administered 
Incantatory Magic  
 
The point of departure for any treatment of this matter is the pleasure (τέρψις, ἡδονή, χάρις) 
and desire (ἵμερος) that music aroused in its public39. Not because “enchantment” (θελκτήρια) 
could not be induced without pleasure. Indeed sometimes it was the product of unbearably 
distressing sensations and emotions 40 . Moreover, not all forms of musically administered 
pleasure were conducive to restoring a “synchronicity” between listeners and their Umwelt that 
was so important in the praxis of sacred “ἔνθεοι ἐπῳδαί”. In fact, it seems that there was only 
one kind of pleasure that could do that, the one called “euphrosyne” after the Charites 
epithetically referred to as “music-loving Euphrosyna” (φιλησίμολπέ Εὐφροσύνα). In any event 
this is something that comes across unmistakeably in those passages of Plato dialogues where 
their author explains its etymology. There we are informed that euphrosyne derives from “εὐ-
φερο-σύνη” which initially meant “the pleasure one feels by moving along harmoniously with 
things”41. What kind of “things” (πράγματα) had to be “harmoniously moved along with” for 
                                                          
38. Cf. for example, Heraclitus DK22B112. It is interesting that in Hippocrates’s On Airs, Waters, Places §24 it 
is not merely assumed that mortal inhabitants will become what the character of their natural environment 
requires they become, there is even a suggestion that it is good for them that they turn out this way.  
39. For the main references on this point, cf. WALSH 1984: 24-5; HALLIWELL 2011: 46ff. and PEPONI 2012: 76. 
For their utility as a means of persuasion and constraint, cf. Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, 2-5; Od. 10.212ff., 
12.36-54, 181-200; Pindar, Olympian, 14.8-10; Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, §9; Plato, Cratylus, 403c, 
Symposium, 186a and Phaedrus, 259b-d. 
40. Cf. Homer Il. 24.719-776; Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, §9 and Plato, Ion 535c-e. For commentary, cf. WALSH 
1984: 4-5 on Od. 8.523-30; FORD 1992: 184-88; HALLIWELL 2011: 64-67 on Od. 24.58-62 and PEPONI 2012: 
30-32 on Od. 1.325-44. 
41. “τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ξυμφέρεσθαι”, Cratylus, 419d. Comp. Timaeus, 47c-e, 80b, Laws, 790d-
791b and Statesman, 274a-d. The epithets used by Pindar in Olympian, 14.8-15 while referring the 
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the mover to experience permitted εὐφ(ε)ροσύνη? The answer Plato supplies in the Timaeus is 
“αἱ τοῦ πάντος κινήσεις”. What this means is that licit εὐφροσύνη results when our minds and 
bodies “kinaesthetically” mime the “movement which governs the whole universe” and 
moreover does so to the fullest extent possible.42 Why this is an adjuvant of a harmonious Man-
Nature relationship speaks for itself. For when and because this sort of “moving” happens, the 
mover is necessitated to a mode of Being and behaving that is “meet” (θέσμιος) because he or 
she is participating actively, voluntarily and joyously in a “lot” (μοῖρα) that has the blessing of 
Ouranos and Gaia, of their daughter Themis, of her daughters the Fates and ultimately of 
creation itself. 
 
Obviously it would be unwise to overlook everything that separates what Plato took these 
κινήσεις to mean from what they were taken to mean by ἐπῳδοί in Song culture for they are 
significant. For example Plato – like the fifth century Pythagorean mathematikoi to whom he 
was deeply indebted – associated the κίνησις τοῦ πάντος very narrowly with “τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν 
φερόμενα”43. In other words, music was conducive to “well-being” and “noble pleasure” when 
it mimed the movements of purely astral agencies interacting with other purely astral agencies44. 
For the archaic practitioners of incantatory magic on the other hand, the κίνησις τοῦ πάντος that 
needed to be mimed to induce εὐφρ(ε)οσύνη were energies descending from “above” (ἄνω) 
blending with energies rising from “below” (κάτω) to yield the “disclosure” (ἀνακάλυψις) of 
what we face and are faced by when we notice “in-der-Welt-sein”. In addition, for Plato 
εὐφροσύνη was the product of purely “intellectual” pursuits involving no contact or fusion with 
the sacred whereas prior to that there is little evidence of frilosité about the idea of communing 
“orgiastically” with the Immortal45.  
 
Still this manner of difference does not alter the fact that for Plato, for the Pythagoreans and for 
archaic ἐπῳδοί alike, musically vehiculated τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη and θελκτήρια were 
                                                          
cosmopoietic functions of “φιλησίμολπέ Εὐφροσύνα” substantially corroborate Plato’s interpretation in these 
passages. 
42. Timaeus, 90cd, comp. Statesman, 274d and Laws, 904c-d. Cf. also SEGAL 1998: 17 as well as FERRARI 2008: 
115ff. on the way εὐφροσύνη was orchestrated, enacted and assimilated and HALLIWELL 2011: 259 on how 
musically induced εὐφροσύνη foregrounds the latter notion of “catharsis”.  
43. Cf. Laws, 967c, Timaeus, 47cff. Rep., 508d, 518c, 526e, 532cd and Epinomis, 977ab, 991b-e. For the 
controversy over how to interpret Aristotle’s reading of ‘Pythagorean’ cosmology and astronomy in De Caelo 
293b2–30, cf. BURKERT 1972: 336-48; KINGSLEY 1995: 175-80 and HUFFMAN 2016: §§4.1-4.2. 
44. Cf. Timaeus, 90a, Laws, 967de, Rep., 616c-617d, Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, viii and Physics, VIII, vi.   
45. BOYANCÉ 1936: 45ff.; CORNFORD 1974: 141; BURKERT 1985: 336-37; VERNANT 1996: 157, 341f.; HARDIE 
2004: 19-21 and PEPONI: 70ff. 
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administered to produce the same result. This would “hypnotise” the listener into a restorative 
“ethological attunement” (ἠθῶν ἐπανόρθωσις, νόον μεταστρέφειν, ἀποκατάστασις) by making 
the intoxicating, quasi-erotic pleasure of moving “kinaesthetically” to the “sweet sounds” of 
melic verse a means to synchronise them to the agency or “κοσμοποιητική δύναμις” of which 
both their world and their being in it are bye-products. About this there can be doubt. For to the 
extent that the melodies and meter used in melic verse were audible mimemata of a 
κοσμοποιητική δύναμις at work in, through and as the Umwelt, one could not want to “move 
to the tune” of the “sweet sounds” modulated by them without ipso facto wanting to move to 
the tune of creation itself.  
 
But melopoeically administered incantatory magic was not just about making the audience 
move “kinaesthetically” and therefore “unconsciously” to the tune of cosmopoiesis simply 
because doing so was too pleasant to resist. It was also about “ἔννοιαν ἐμποιεῖν”, i.e., getting 
listeners to know that this was happening, to know why it was important to be harmonised this 
way and to know how to participate in cultivating, diversifying and perpetuating the kinds of 
felicity one was promised by being harmonised to the all-orchestrating “blessed ballet of the 
Muses” (εὐδαίμονι χορείᾳ Μουσῶν). Attaining felicity like this required that the audience 
receive an “upbringing” (παιδεία) whose impact was to “bewitch” their affective, conative and 
cognitive faculties just as much as their “pleasure principle”46. More than that, the ethos that 
music “kinaesthetically” instilled in them had to be engineered into way and means, norms and 
values, finalities and modalities compliance with which necessitated them to behaving and 
being in a way that was “fitting” (θέσμιος, σὺν δίκᾳ, εὖ κατὰ κόσμον).  
 
This is what we see when we look at the way the archaic Hellenes conducted their day-to-day 
existence. In effect, the “enchanted” worldview instilled in them via their “musical upbringing” 
was mobilised and “operationalised” in virtually everything they did. Not because it was the 
inspired singer’s goal to “micro-manage” their private affairs. That was not possible. And yet 
it cannot be denied that the melopoeically vehiculated “meta-message” (ὑπόνοια, αἶνος) 
propagated enchantingly via “sacred song” nonetheless profoundly influenced the practice of 
every occupation, vocation and calling for the entire paideia. This is so because its influence 
                                                          
46. This is why “being educated” and “being musical” were then considered to be synonymous (cf. PLATO, 
Protagoras, 326ab, Timaeus, 80b, Republic, 376e, 401d and Laws, 654a-d, 672e, 666d). For discussion and 
commentary, see MARROU 1948: 43, 76, KOLLER 1963: 86-95 & MURRAY & WILSON 2004: 15, 22, 184, 365ff. 
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was not “instructional”. It was “epideictic” or “parainetic”. In other words, both through words 
and “music” it set forth broad normatising guidelines or paradigms that had to be respected in 
the way one pursued one’s pragmateia to be sure that it was “done the right way” (σὺν κόσμῳ, 
ἐναίσιμος, ἐν τῷ δεόντι παραγιγνέται)47. 
 
To form an idea of how this worked in practice, let us restrict ourselves to the one pursuit which 
is the most relevant to the subject of this paper which is, let us recall, an attempt to see how the 
incantatory magic propagated through “Song” fostered an entente cordiale with Nature and why 
for this reason it should be considered an “eco-communicological” resource contemporary 
Global society ought to consider emulating and operationalizing. The area of activity which 
best helps us see how ἐπῳδή is relevant and useful for that is “χειροτέχνη” or “κατὰ τέχνην 
ποίησις”, i.e., “applied science” and “technology”.  
 
The “Technological” and “Industrial” Impacts of ἔνθεος ἐπῳδής 
 
Because of an essentially “animist” or “panzoist” mentality which maintains that everything 
that exists is alive and therefore “besouled”, technology could not be licit except where its “raw 
material” was “sourced” and interacted with on an “I-Thou” basis48. To respect this limitation 
and yet withal interact with the Umwelt for productivistic and consumeristic purposes the 
Hellenes of Song culture resorted to a canny expedient: they replicated the ingenuity 
(εὐμηχανική) that produced the cosmos in the technologies they utilised to interact productively 
with the Umwelt in order to satisfy mortal needs and desires49. As a result, the mortal artificer 
(δημιουργός) was in a relationship with the immortal “Thou” he sourced that Jacques Ellul 
called an “éthique technicienne de la non-puissance” and Martin Heidegger a productive “Co-
letting-Be-together” (Zusammengehörenlassen) 50 . In other words, in plying his trade the 
“cunning artificer” (ἔντεχνος δημιουργός) did not “do” anything to the “Thou” he sourced that 
                                                          
47. On “epideictic discourse”, cf. WALKER 2000: 10ff. and on “parainetics”, FORD 1992: 30f. and WALKER 2011: 
94-106. For the way Song mediated parainetic paradigms that were replicable in various ways to deal with 
everyday affairs, cf. BURCKHARDT 2002: 162; WALSH 1984: 43-48, 55 (on Pindar); SEGAL 1998: 54-55; 
GENTILI 1988: 73, 86-87 (on Alcman, Sappho and the Homeric Hymns); NAGY 1996: 57-58 and FOLEY 1991: 
7ff. 
48. Though contemporary discussion about this feature of early Hellenic paideia tends to get lost under all the 
ways it is interpreted by experts (cf. HEINRICHS 2010: 22ff. on Thales’ emblematic “θεῶν πλήρη πάντα”), it 
seems fair to say that few would question the appropriateness of the qualifier “animistic” in referring to the 
“archaic” Hellenic Worldview (cf. COLLINS 2008: 31-33).  
49. SOLMSEN 1963; HEIDEGGER 1989: 97 and VERNANT 1996: 305; BENNETT 2015: 59f. 
50. HEIDEGGER 1959: 58-59 and ELLUL 1983: 14ff.   
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this latter had to be coerced or bullied into being or doing to be useful to mortals. Instead the 
artisan allowed the “living”, “besouled” raw material he sourced be what it is, the way it chose 
to be and merely assisted it to be (a) what it is the way it wanted to be and at the same time (b) 
useful for human purposes. Moreover, he did this without his “assistance” in any way 
amounting to an obfuscation of what was “God-given” about his raw material. To the contrary, 
the goal was to highlight the divinity (ἀγλαία) of the artefact (χειροτέχνημα) he crafted by 
showing how it was “alive” with the “sacred giving” that gave it the “raw material” the artisan 
had “artefactualised”51. Hence, whatever product of early Hellenic technology and industry one 
may choose to speak of, be it a shoe or a ship, a temple or a stool, we can be certain that, in so 
far as they had any right to be considered cosmodictically consecrated, we have to do with 
instances of the way the Mortal and the Immortal were co-orchestrated in such a way as to 
produce a “gift from the Gods” (παρὰ θεῶν δῶρα)52. Not because anyone thought the artisan 
who appeared to be doing all the work in fact was not “doing” anything. Only because no one 
believed he was doing his job “the right way” unless what he produced was “sourced” in such 
a way as to make the result seem to be a “living” gift from the sacred53. All of which is relevant 
to this paper because it testifies to a technological and industrial modus operandi which was so 
environmentally responsible that it quite literally revered the raw materials it sourced.  
 
Were one to inquire into why observance of this “I-Thou” relationship had the binding effect 
upon artisans that it evidently enjoyed, one would quickly and easily identify pressures which 
look prescriptive and injunctive. For every craft had its appointed tutelary divinity (χειρῶναξ) 
and the role played by the latter in the craftsmen’s guilds over whom they presided was not 
merely ceremonial or honorary. It was to ensure the observance of tradition consecrated, 
cosmodictically mandatory norms and rules. And unquestionably part of the reason 
                                                          
51. VERNANT 1996 : 302ff. illustrates this aspect of ancient craftsmanship by comparing the social status of the 
artisan in the archaic age with what it became when “la technè s’est libérée du magique et du religieux”. The 
most important consequence of the “laïcisation des métiers” that followed was a “dépréciation du statut 
artisanal” (p. 318). According to Vernant this is because the value the craftsman added to his workmanship 
by his ability to infuse it with a sacral essence (cf. GERNET 1995: 170ff.) was definitively lost. From then on 
the only worth his productivity could have was its utilitarian and commercial value (p. 318-19). 
52. FRONTISI-DUCROUX 2002: 469-72. Cf. also Plato, Statesman 274cd, Symposium, 197ab and Ion, 537c on the 
origin of the technai as “παρὰ θεῶν δῶρα” and Laws, 771ab on the importance of making the sacred the 
organising principle of all norms and laws.  
53. S.F. Jims’s study of “first-fruits” (aparchai) sacrifices to various Gods illustrates how important it was for the 
Hellenes of earlier times to express gratitude to the living forces of Nature even when the benefits for which 
one made the sacrifice were entirely the result of human effort and ingenuity (JIM 2014: 133-149). The only 
meaning that can be attributed to this practice is that mortal artisans recognised that, because of the way they 
sourced the artefacts ‘they’ produced, the result is always ultimately a gift from the sacred and that it was 
indecent not to acknowledge this gift by sharing with the Gods some of the bounty the latter bestowed.  
MARBURG JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2020) 
 
26 
practitioners took these norms seriously was a fear that not doing so entailed the wrath and 
retribution of the Erinyes ever ready to punish anyone who transgressed the cosmic “χορεία” 
presided over by Themis, the Moirae, the Heures, the Charites and a host of other 
“Augenblicksgötter” (VERNANT 1996: 318; DETIENNE & VERNANT: 1974: 105-6, 186n.49).  
 
However, as great an error as it would be to overlook or underestimate the injunctive pressures 
this placed upon conscientious craftsmen, a far greater error would be to ignore the efficacy of 
“enchanting” incantatory magic as a catalyst in getting Hellenic homo faber in Song culture to 
interact on an “I-Thou” basis with the living environment in whose midst he dwelt. Not just 
because the “music” used to practice ἐπῳδή was quite literally the very voice of the Immortal 
“Thou” that craftsmen, and indeed all of Hellenic humanity, were expected to heed and 
venerate. Nor because this “music” encoded and epi-phonised a “σημεία” that functioned as a 
“keynote meaning” or “Grundstimmung” for all the supplementary meanings that had to be 
grafted onto it to make it pertinent and useful for a host of average everyday pursuits 
(πραγματεία). Also, and above all, because the hypnosis it was practiced to administer 
subserved a single goal: representing world-disclosive, world-forming cosmopoeitic activity in 
melodised tones and metered rhythms and making listeners want to move in harmony to their 
tune because the delight (τέρψις) and enchantment (θελκτήρια) they felt – or were promised to 
feel – by doing so was too enjoyable to resist.  
 
This, as we saw above, was essential for attaining that “ethological attunement” (ἠθῶν 
ἐπανόρθωσις, νόον μεταστρέφειν, “ἀποκατάστασις”) that constituted the root for all the virtues 
the Hellenes of Song culture were supposed to aspire to and exemplify. It was a question of 
coaxing folks away from one habitus and towards another. Away from a natural penchant for 
excess or deficiency with respect to what it is salutary for the kosmos for men and societies to 
be and towards a mode of Being which was ethologically “appropriate” (εὐήθης) for men and 
societies to observe because the habitus they were enchanted into occupying was the one it was 
good for the kosmos for them to occupy54. That is why ἐπῳδή was no more about pandering to 
seekers of “pleasure for pleasure’s sake” than it was about attempting to coerce listeners into 
doing or behaving in any particular way. For in the final analysis all it aimed at was to harness 
mortal appetition and volition to the goal of finding delight in occupying a cosmically ordained 
time, place, nature and destiny which was “ethologically appropriate” to occupy because doing 
                                                          
54. Plato, Charmides, 156b-157b; Laws, 903bc and Statesman, 274a-d.  
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so was compatible with the cosmically ordained time, place, nature and destiny it was 
“appropriate” for the people and things around one to occupy and enjoy occupying. The ability 
of the singers of “sacred song” to bring about this sort of attunement is what made their art 
“magical”.  
 
But does this mean withal that it is or could be a normatising “communicological” resource 
contemporary Global society ought to consider adopting to negotiate an entente cordiale with 
the living Umwelt we dwell in? The answer I offer to that question follows a reminder of  the 
main argument of this paper.  
 
Recapitulation and Concluding Remarks 
 
Troubled by the consequences of Global Society’s inability to engineer a sustainable modus 
vivendi with the planet it inhabits, we asked if part of the solution might not lie in the conception 
and operationalisation of a “function system” specifically designed to negotiate an entente 
cordiale with our more-than-human Lebenswelt. We considered the communication strategies 
premised by the tenets of “constructivism” and “realism” and saw that they lead nowhere, as 
do those wrought of “consilient” syntheses of these two approaches. We therefore proposed 
something “radical”. We suggested that a model to follow to deal with the communication 
challenge at issue might be found in the “magical worldview” which we defined as a “pre-
rational rationality” against which both the “Modernist” and the “Post-modernist” rationalities 
define themselves in the way they forswear any mediating role for a “transcendental agency” 
acting as a go-between the human and non-human worlds. To keep our considerations within 
manageable limits we confined ourselves only to “incantatory magic” in archaic Greece, 
focusing in particular on those aspects which illustrated how it facilitated dialogue between 
humankind and its non-human Other. We saw that the “music” composed and performed by 
“inspired poet-singers” (ἔνθεοι ἀοιδοί, μουσοποιοί) played a key role in this dialogue. This was 
achieved first by giving a voice and a language to the astro-meteoro-hydro-geological realities 
of the place where the client community dwelt, second making the intelligence related through 
this language a source code out of which the community synthesised its “encyclopaedia” and 
organised the totality of the ways it interfaced with the world and, finally, by using the 
enchantment of hearing it a means to instil in the listener a desire to observe modes of 
perceiving, desiring, thinking and behaving whose net effect was to foster an “ethological 
attunement” between the community and the natural environment. So is this communicational 
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model amenable to applications that are relevant to contemporary Global society’s 
communication needs? 
 
At first sight the idea might strike some as something of a joke and even a provocation. After 
all, doesn’t the modus vivendi of the “magical worldview” boil down to an infringement of the 
“dignity” of humankind? Indeed, is it not a way of reducing it to servitude by hypnotically 
dispossessing human beings of their “critical” faculties and their “free will”? And what about 
the concerns raised by those who warn us about the “socially reactionary” nature of “traditional” 
worldviews?55 Is it not to be feared that the paideia we just looked at was in some sense an 
elaborate hoax stage-managed by the intolerably cynical to deceive and despoil the pathetically 
gullible?  
 
Admittedly, it could well seem that way. But besides being anachronistic, these objections are 
countered by at least two substantial arguments. First, at the time and in the culture we are 
concerned with, the goal of this way of co-existing with the more-than-human universe had 
nothing to do with disserving or impugning anyone, and those who best know the history of the 
period insist on it.56 Instead the goal was to submit both Man and his non-human Other to a 
“cosmodicy” whose existence and operations were postulated to make facilitating the felicity 
of Man a function of facilitating the felicity of Other-than-Man. Hence as this felicity was 
reciprocal or “do ut des”, the belittling or servitude of Man by Non-Man or Non-Man by Man 
was in no wise implied. And this is pertinent to the second argument which is that there was 
nothing anti- or less-than-“anthropological” about this modus vivendi. In fact, in a sense, it was 
a way of being “anthropocentric” as efficaciously as possible. For that is all one does when one 
makes sure that humanity’s dependence on Nature operates in favour of humanity’s felicity by 
making that felicity a by-product of a relationship to Nature which respects rather than exploits 
it. This remark brings us to the final point I want to make in this paper. This is that there is 
nothing farfetched about expecting Religion and Science to embrace this “rationalism” and 
factor it into their respective acceptations of “progress” so that they can, in tandem, negotiate 
an entente cordiale between Nature and Global Society. And in support of this claim I will not 
adduce the proof provided by the success of “primitive” societies from time immemorial in 
                                                          
55. See, inter alia, BLOCH 1975. 
56. Against those who complain about the socially conservative and repressive nature of the traditional lore 
transmitted in mythology, see JAEGER 1965: 58; FINNEGAN 1977: 212-13, 242-43; GENTILI 1988: 109; 
WALKER 2000: 12-13 and GARCIA 2002: 49-50. 
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utilizing it and making it the basis of their values and norms, their principles and practices, their 
Science and Technology, their morality and spirituality and their Being and Doing. Instead of 
arguing that this manner of co-existing with Humankind’s Other is altogether rational and 
tenable, I will suggest that all that is irrational and untenable for Global Society today is the 
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